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PLURALISM ABOUT TRUTH IN EARLY CHINESE PHILOSOPHY:
A REFLECTION ON WANG CHONG’S APPROACH
ALEXUS MCLEOD

ABSTRACT: The debate concerning truth in Classical Chinese philosophy has for the
most part avoided the possibility that pluralist theories of truth were part of the classical
philosophical framework. I argue that the Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong (c. 25-100
CE) can be profitably read as endorsing a kind of pluralism about truth grounded in the
concept of shi 實, or “actuality”. In my exploration of this view, I explain how it offers a
different account of the truth of moral and non-moral statements, while still retaining the
univocality of the concept of truth (that is, that the concept amounts to more than the
expression of a disjunction of various truth properties), by connecting shi with normative and
descriptive facts about how humans appraise statements. In addition to providing insight into
pluralist views of truth in early China, the unique pluralist view implicit in Wang’s work can
help solve problems with contemporary pluralist theories of truth.
Keywords: Wang Chong, alethic pluralism, truth, Classical Chinese Philosophy, Han
dynasty, truth in early China, metaphysics, actuality, shi-fei, shi-xu

There has been a great deal of discussion about whether early (pre-Buddhist) Chinese
philosophers had a concept of truth. Much of this debate has been weighed down by
the problematic assumption that the property expressed by the predicate ‘is true’, (or
by any predicate in Chinese that roughly corresponds to the predicate in English ‘is
true’) is something like correspondence between truth-apt propositions and “states-ofaffairs”, and that any candidate concept in early Chinese philosophy for “truth” thus
must express such a property. Generally, when scholars have shown a particular
thinker or school within the Chinese tradition to be concerned with properties of
sentences, names, teachings, propositions, or whatever bit of language is being
considered, or when it is conceded that a particular thinker did have a conception of
truth, they have taken him as primarily concerned with pragmatic properties of
linguistic structures, such as “assertability” or usefulness for social harmony, etc.,
rather than correspondence properties,1 and have concluded that these thinkers were
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either not interested in (or had no concept of) truth, or had a pragmatist conception of
truth.2
This assumption is false, and misses something important about the philosophy of
language and metaphysics in the work of classical Chinese thinkers. The predicate ‘is
true’ does not have to be understood as expressing a correspondence property—
indeed, the numerous debates within philosophy of language and metaphysics that
rage today are over whether there is any property of truth at all, and if so what that
property is. So it is far from obvious that any Chinese concept that can be understood
as a concept of truth must be “truth as correspondence”. To hold this would simply be
to deny that coherentists, pragmatists about truth, or deflationists (who reject any
metaphysical property associated with the predicate ‘is true’) are really talking about
truth when they theorize about truth. Even if these philosophers are ultimately wrong
about truth, it is wrong to say that they’re not offering theories of truth. Likewise, in
considering the early Chinese philosophers, we should be open to the possibility that
they were operating with a conception of truth different from that of a correspondence
theorist. Perhaps they were pragmatists, for example, and simply thought of the
Chinese equivalents of ‘is true’ [such as ran (然), shi (是), you (有), shi (實), etc.] as
expressing pragmatic properties.
I do not think, however, that this was the case. I believe it can be useful to see
some of the early Chinese philosophers as pluralists about truth. That is, ‘is true,’
according to these thinkers, expresses different properties in different linguistic
contexts. In some contexts the predicate ‘is true’ (然 ran, 實 shi, or whatever is
playing the role of the truth predicate for the particular philosopher) might express the
property of something like correspondence between sentences and states of affairs,
1

That is, correspondence theory as an account of relations between propositions and states-of-affairs,
not what we might call correspondence-truth in a folk theoretical sense, or what we might call the
“correspondence intuition”, that what is true must mirror in some sense the way things are.
2
This is not true across the board, however. David Hall and Roger Ames argue in the above way (see
Ames and Hall, 1998, Part 2), as does Chad Hansen, while Bryan Van Norden, for example, rejects
this view. Van Norden’s arguments are also problematic, however, as he seems to share the “truth as
correspondence” assumption, and instead takes the tactic of denying that the early philosophers were
primarily interested in pragmatic properties, but were indeed interested in something like
correspondence. In specific, Van Norden claims that the early philosophers were concerned about truth
because the predicate (specifically, ran) he identifies with ‘is true’ operates in the way dictated by
Tarski’s T-schema—that for any sentence x, ‘x’ is true iff x—where the single quoted use of x is an
occurrence in the object language and everything else is in the metalanguage. I believe that, unless the
early philosophers were something like deflationists and thought there was nothing more to truth than
this rule of the operation of the predicate ran, this cannot have been enough to define a concept of
truth. The fact that they do, and Wang Chong certainly does, offer a more robust conception of truth
than the simple semantic rule account, shows us that they had a different conception of truth than that
of contemporary deflationists. Most importantly, the T-schema does not commit one to anything like
correspondence (although proponents of deflationism might argue that it does account for the folk
correspondence intuition). A truth predicate will obey the T-schema even if the truth predicate is
robustly pragmatic, having nothing at all to do with the “way the world is.” Thus the T-schema can’t
serve as a kind of “thin” conception of correspondence, or as a way to make sense of a folk conception
of correspondence between statements and reality.
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and in other contexts 3 ‘is true’ 4 might express the property of assertability or
usefulness to advance social harmony.
Below I argue that the Eastern Han dynasty philosopher Wang Chong’s (c. 25100 CE) conception of 實 shi in the Lun-Heng can be profitably and plausibly
interpreted as a concept of truth unifying different properties in different linguistic
contexts. The pluralist conception of truth arising from Wang’s work differs
significantly from contemporary pluralist theories of truth on a number of issues. The
points of difference between these theories can be highly instructive in helping us
understand the purpose and acceptability of pluralism about truth and the concept of
truth in general, and as such can contribute to the contemporary debate about truth. I
begin by discussing three different contemporary pluralist views of truth. In section 1,
then continue to discuss the concept of shi and its evolution through early Chinese
history in section 2. In section 3 I demonstrate the plausibility of reading Wang’s
Lun-Heng as offering a pluralist conception of truth which lends itself to a particular
explication and development, and I show how such a pluralist theory can both inform
the contemporary debate surrounding truth and pluralism and help us understand how
early Chinese philosophers in general thought about truth.
1. COMTEMPORARY THEORIES OF ALETHIC PLURALISM
Pluralism about truth, or alethic pluralism, is relatively recent to the contemporary
(post 20th century) debate about truth, although it has predecessors throughout the
history of western philosophy, and, I will argue below, in the history of Chinese
philosophy (as well as the classical Indian tradition, where the Buddhist “two truths”
view is an example5).
Contemporary pluralist theories of truth can generally be seen as a reaction to the
perceived failure of “monist” theories of truth. Monist theories of truth generally take
the concept of truth to express a particular single property belonging to certain
linguistic entities—whether propositions, sentences, statements, or something else6.
3

Or “discourses”, or “domains”. Philosophers discussing pluralist theories of truth have spoken in both
ways. Michael Lynch speaks of “domains” (Lynch 2009), while Crispin Wright, (Wright 1992) speaks
of “practices”. Lynch says, in a statement of his functionalist pluralism: “For atomic propositions,
ontologically distinct manifestations of truth are manifestations relative to a domain…a proposition is
true because it has the further property that manifests truth for that domain.” (Lynch 2009, p. 76)
4
Or shi, ran, etc.—as I will argue below the variety of terms used to capture something like “truth”
which are all functionally very similar are unified in Wang Chong’s use of shi as a catch-all and
something like an explanation of a functional concept operative in all linguistic contexts in which there
can be truth-apt statements, teachings, etc.
5
The “two truths” view is that there are two levels of truth, relative truth and ultimate truth, and that
some propositions or statements might be true in one sense but not the other, but that it is justified to
call a statement meeting the normative objectives of one or other of these levels “true” (sat). For a
good philosophical exposition of the “two truths” theory see Siderits 2003, ch. 8.
6
There has been debate over what kinds of entities are “truth-apt”, which goes beyond the scope of this
paper, and this debate connects closely to that over truth itself, as some views of truth-apt linguistic
entities (such as propositions) are highly implausible as linguistic objects to certain philosophers and
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Monist theories of truth differ with respect to what they identify as this truth-making
property. Contemporary monist theories have generally come in three loosely defined
types:
correspondence theories, coherence theories, and pragmatic theories. 7 All such
theories are monist theories of truth, because they take truth to be a single property
expressed by the concept of truth, such that anything which is truth-apt is so in terms
of the possibility of having this single property. The only way things can be true is to
have the single property the theory equates with the property of truth, for example,
correspondence with states of affairs, coherence with beliefs or general worldview,
etc.8
Pluralist theories of truth are not necessarily in full disagreement with monist
theories of truth on specific properties. One of the main features of pluralist theories
is that they hold the predicate ‘is true’ expresses different properties in different
domains or discourses (or however we define the relevant context). A pluralist might
hold, then, that ‘true’ in discussions of physics or metaphysics, for example,
expresses a property of correspondence, while ‘true’ in discussions of ethics or
aesthetics expresses a property of coherence with other beliefs and one’s general
worldview.
One important feature of pluralist theories of truth is the notion of the
requirements particular concepts must meet in order to be a concept of truth. Pluralist
theories are in a difficult position in some sense. They offer ways to understand the
concept of truth, and as such purport to be offering us an explanation of a single
concept. The concept of truth itself is not plural—there is one concept of truth-on this
much they agree with monist theories of truth. The key to pluralist theories is that the
single concept of truth can express different properties in different domains or
linguistic contexts, whereas monist theories hold that the single concept expresses one
single property in all linguistic contexts in which there are truth-apt linguistic entities.
The monist, however, has an easy way of defining the concept of truth—as the
concept that expresses the particular property they identify with the truth property.
The pluralist does not have this option. Although pluralist theories need to make
may constitute reasons against holding certain theories of truth (for example correspondence theories)
insofar as these theories commit one to acceptance of these linguistic entities.
7
These are all fairly loosely defined, of course, and theories within certain categories may radically
differ from each other, while sharing some family resemblance to other theories of its kind. Perhaps the
least well-defined of the categories of theory mentioned here is that of pragmatic theories of truth,
which includes anti-realist theories of a variety of kinds.
8
Another kind of theory of truth which will not be explicitly discussed here (mainly because none of
the early Chinese philosophers held anything like this conception of truth) is the deflationary
(sometimes also called disquotational) theory of truth, which denies that there is a robust property of
truth at all, and understands truth as simply a tool for sentence evaluation that works in the way
specified by Tarski’s T-schema—for any sentence x, ‘x’ is true iff x—where the single quoted use of x
is an occurrence in the object language and everything else is in the metalanguage. That is, according
to the deflationist, there is nothing more to truth than the syntactic rules for its use described by the Tschema (there are a number of different approaches to deflationist uses of the T-schema—see Gupta
1993), and looking for a robust property of truth belonging to linguistic entities is fruitless.
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sense of the univocality of truth, they cannot do so by defining the concept of truth as
the concept expressing the truth property, because there are numerous truth
properties, dependent on context.9 And it doesn’t solve the problem to think of the
concept of truth as expressing a disjunction of all the various properties in different
domains or contexts the truth predicate expresses (such that ‘x is true’ iff x
corresponds with states of affairs when x is a statement of physics, or x coheres with
a general worldview when x is a statement of ethics… or…., etc). It is not, however,
the disjunction that makes a statement of physics true, but the single property of
correspondence. So with the disjunctive response there has been a failure to explain
what it is about correspondence and about coherence (or whatever multiple properties
of truth exist in the theory) have in common which make them truth properties. They
certainly don’t share the disjunction in common.
There are a few different ways one might answer the objection that pluralism
theories cannot express truth as univocal. The different pluralist theories will turn on
these answers. One way to make sense of the univocality of truth is to offer as a
description of the concept of truth a set of platitudes about truth that any property
must meet in order to count as a property of truth. In this way, we are able to have a
univocal concept of truth, but one that will pick out a number of different properties
in different domains or contexts, as different properties in these contexts will meet the
requirements of the platitudes about truth. Crispin Wright famously takes this tactic,
and offers a number of features of a truth property we might take to be platitudes
about truth any property must meet to count as a truth property.
Wright proposes a list of platitudes as descriptive of the concept of truth (features
that any property must meet in order to be a truth property), including “transparency”“that to assert is to present as true”, “opacity- that there are some truths we may never
know or are incapable of coming to know”, and “correspondence”- that for a
proposition to be true it has to (in some sense) correspond to reality.10 The platitudes
Wright mentions are negotiable—as we learn more about truth and how it works in
different domains, we may find that some of the “platitudes” are unreasonable or
otherwise wrong, and we may discover that there are other things that should be
added to the list of platitudes.
Another way to capture the univocality of truth has been offered by Michael
Lynch, who defines truth as a functional property. There is a particular property
picked out by the predicate ‘is true’ across contexts, but this property can be realized
9

Although a number of pluralist theories will attempt to identify the concept of truth with a single truth
property in order to capture univocality, this single property for the pluralist will have to be connected
in some way to other “truth” properties within specific contexts. For Lynch, the connection is based on
the nature of the single truth property connected with the concept of truth as a functional property, such
that different specific properties in different contexts can play the functional role of the truth property.
For Mou, the connection is based on the specfication of the single truth property as the thinly specified
property of non-linguistic truth, of “the way things are.”
10
(Wright 2001, p. 760). Wright offers seven platitudes here, and concedes after this “the list might be
enlarged, and some of these principles may anyway seem controversial.” He’s not committed, that is,
to exactly this list. Also see Wright 1992.
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by different robust properties in different contexts. This move avoids commitment to
truth as a second-order property such as “the property of having a property that meets
the truth platitudes,” which Lynch sees as problematic, and I discuss in section 3.4
below.11
Bo Mou has offered a different way to understand a pluralist concept of truth.
According to Mou, the general thesis that truth “captures the way things are” 12 can be
represented in different ways in different “perspectives”, through elaborations within
given perspectives that are principles (fixed to perspective) expressing this basic
thesis, such that the nature of truth itself is represented differently in different
perspectives, while there is still a unified conception of truth underlying all of these
perspective-based principles. 13 In this way, Mou offers a pluralist that attempts to
capture the univocality of the concept of truth through a single truth property whose
plurality is accounted for by its different representation across perspectives.
I argue below that Wang Chong’s conception of shi (實) as a tool for appraisal of
teachings and linguistic entities offers us a detailed and explicitly pluralist theory of
truth that operates differently from the three pluralist alternatives discussed above,
although in certain key ways it is closest to Crispin Wright’s view, as it does take the
truth property to be a second-order property, but one based on basic facts about what
humans do and should look for in statements, rather than on a list of platitudes
concerning truth. While the view I will explain in the final section below may be
thought of as simply a different way of specifying platitudes, it will turn out to be one
that avoids some of the problems with Wright’s view.

11

Although in earlier work on truth as functional, Lynch accepted something like a higher order truth
property, (see Lynch 2001), he has since modified his functionalist view such that it does not take truth
as a higher order property. (Lynch 2009, p. 66: “truth can’t be a second-order property…that would
imply that truth is the property of having some property that has certain features. But does the secondorder property itself have those features?”) He describes truth as manifested in certain contexts (or
domains) in the following way: “Necessarily, P has the property that manifests truth for propositions of
D if, and only if, it is a priori that, when had by atomic propositions of domain D, the truish features
are a proper subset of M’s features,” where ‘P’ is a propositional variable, ‘D’ is a domain variable,
and ‘M’ is a variable ranging over possible manifesting properties, or realizers, of truth” (Lynch 2009,
p. 77).
12
(Mou 2009, p. 3). He has interestingly connected this to the concern with dao in early Chinese
thought. In much of early Chinese philosophy, Mou claims, the basic truth thesis is understood in
terms of capturing the dao, and different elaboration perspectives do this differently.
13
Mou calls this basic thesis of truth the “axiomatic thesis of the nature of truth” (ATNT), and
formulates it thus: “The nature of truth (of the truth bearer) consists in (the truth bearer’s) capturing
the way things are” (Mou 2009, p. 3). Interestingly, one of the things Mou atttempts to capture in his
truth pluralism is the connection between not only truth in different linguistic contexts but also
connection between linguistic and non-linguistic truth. Wang Chong, like other early Chinese
philosophers, had a view of truth as a property of linguistic as well as non-linguistic entities. The issue
of non-linguistic truth has been neglected, I believe, in much contemporary work on truth, and one of
the advantages of looking to the early Chinese philosophers, as Mou does, is to understand how we
might think of different types of truth.
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2. SHI (實) IN ITS MEANING AS “REALITY” OR “ACTUALITY”
The term shi (實) is used in many different senses in both Pre-Han and Han literature.
This makes it especially difficult to isolate the use connecting shi (實) to truth, and in
particular the pluralistic conception of the concept Wang Chong held.
The Eastern Han Shuo-Wen-Jie-Zi, compiled by Xu Shen, offers an etymology of
shi. According to the Shuo-Wen, shi is defined as fu (富), or “fortune, wealth”. It is
broken into the mian (宀) (“roof”) radical and beneath it the character guan (貫),
which is explained as coins (bei 貝) strung together on a thread.14 This shows us that
shi is understood (according to Xu’s etymology) as the wealth contained under one’s
roof—what one has stored away. We can see how this conception of shi leads to a
conception of it as both something like “actuality” (or what is the real substance of a
situation or person—we will see this conception play a large role in what is to follow),
and “fullness”. It is harder to see how we get from the Shuo-Wen’s definition of shi to
the sense of shi as “particular object” or the literal sense of “fruit” (we might wonder
whether the literal sense of “fruit” could have been derived from seeing the fruit of a
tree as the “fullness” or result of the full growth of the tree).
The specific sense of shi I am most interested in for purposes of this study is the
sense of shi as something like “reality” or “actuality”. Shi used in this way has a
history itself. It evolved from the early uses in Pre-Qin texts15 to become something
new in the Eastern Han thinkers, especially in the work of Wang Chong and later Xu
Gan (170-217 CE). When we consider the use of shi as “actual properties” to evaluate
sentences, as Wang often uses the term, we find that the most plausible interpretation
of his use of shi in various linguistic contexts is as a theoretical basis for truth claims.
If we examine the connection of the linguistic evaluative terms shi (是) and fei (非),
as well as ran (然) and fou (否) to Wang’s shi as “actual properties” (as I do in a
section below), we begin to see the shape of a fairly robust theory of truth underlying
his philosophical method and his discussion of language and the teachings of earlier
philosophers.
This use of shi in the sense of “substantiality” or “actuality” is a major feature in a
number of Pre-Qin and Han works on the relationship between 名 ming, (“name”)
and shi (實) (“actuality” or “reality”). Consideration of this issue can be found in the
later Mohist and School of Names literature (especially in the Gongsunlongzi). It
became a major issue in Eastern Han thought.

14

It may help to mention that this is the same guan used in the famous (or infamous, depending on
one’s view of its true importance) “one strand” passage of the Analects, 4.15.
15
There are uses of the term in the Analects, as “fullness” or “fruit” (Analects 8.5, 9.22), but the
earliest philosophical use of the term in the Confucian texts is in the Mencius. Mencius 4B45, for
example, reads 言無實不祥。不祥之實，蔽賢者當之. (“Words without shi are not auspicious.
Inauspicious shi conceal what the sages undertake.”) Other examples of this use of shi occur at
Mencius 4A27 and 7A37, and there is a consideration of ming-shi at 6B26.
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One of the features of this use of shi is its reference to linguistic entities, such as
names, rather than physical objects, as in other uses of the term. 16 The reason that this
term becomes linked with consideration of names (ming 名) is that it is consideration
of shi that is connected with the appropriateness of names. Wang, as I will show
below, thinks of shi not as primarily connected with names, but rather with sentences.
This is why the majority of his discussions of shi are connected with yan (言 “words”,
or “what is said”) rather than ming—Wang is attempting to make clear that the
contents of what is said in statements17 (or teachings) can be shi.18
John Makeham considers the correlative thought of the early Han (especially that
of Dong Zhongshu) to be a major source of the view of shi as justifying the
application of names to things, locating there what he calls a “correlative theory of
naming.”19 For Dong, it is the intentions of tian (天) which justify certain names,
rather than shi (實) (which Makeham argues is an innovation of Xu Gan’s). In Dong’s
work we see a movement toward correlative theories of naming based on the
connection between tian and names. Names, on this view, gain their applicability or
acceptability based on their correlation with (or, one might say, correspondence with)
certain features of the world—in Dong’s case, features of tian.20
I agree with Makeham that this is a major source of the transformation of the shi
concept from that of something similar to “essence” or “substance” to a higher-order
concept expressing actual properties of discussed entities (whether linguistic or
otherwise). However, I do not think that Xu Gan was the first thinker to use shi as
justificatory for naming (or the acceptability of sentences or other linguistic entities),
or the basis for names. The earlier philosopher, Wang Chong, used shi as a way to
evaluate linguistic entities whether (sometimes) names or (more often) sentences,
teachings, and beliefs 21. One of Wang Chong’s innovations was to apply shi to a
16

In much of the early literature, such as the Five Classics, shi is used with the sense of “fruit”, as it is
in the Analects, or as “full” or “solid particular object.”
17
Yan is not specific enough to allow us to consider whether by it Wang means something closer to
“sentence”, “proposition”, “utterance”, etc. It is unclear whether it refers to what is said or the content
of what is said, or whether Wang takes there to be such a distinction at all. It sometimes appears to
refer to what is said, sometimes to the content of what is said, but this is consistent with a number of
different possibilities, including that Wang saw no difference between the two uses, or that he intended
to express different senses of yan in different contexts. For this reason, I don’t commit to a particular
linguistic entity as expressed by yan, and use the term ‘statement’ which is comparatively neutral
(although I realize that this term is fairly philosophically loaded as well).
18
The distinction between yan and ming in the Lun-Heng is clear. Yan refers to a linguistic string
rather than to an individual word, unless the individual word serves as a statement—for example, the
word ke 可 (“acceptable”) used as a response in the Gong-Sun-Long-Zi, can be an example of yan.
19
Makeham 1994, ch. 5.
20
specifically the 天意 tian yi, or “notions or intentions of heaven”. Dong does use shi in connection
with names in the Chun-Qiu-Fan-Lu, (in the Chu-Zhuang-Wang chapter, for example, he says 此聞其
名而不知其實者也 [“this is to be one who hears its name but does not know its shi”]), but his
understanding of what shi represents seems to be based on its mirroring of tian.
21
One feature, and some may think, weakness, of Wang’s account, is that he did not consider there to
be a single underlying structure of sentences, teachings, and beliefs which make these things truth apt.
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wider range of entities, including statements or teachings. It is the goal of what
follows to show how Wang’s shi operates with respect to statements, how this view
of shi presents us with a pluralist theory of truth,22 and then consider how this kind of
pluralism can both help us in the contemporary debate and in our understanding of
ancient Chinese philosophy.
3. SHI IN THE LUN-HENG—A THEORY OF ALETHIC PLURALISM
3.1. SHI AS NORMATIVELY POSITIVE PROPERTY
Two essays in particular in the Lun-Heng offer us the greatest insight on Wang’s view
of shi as a pluralist concept of truth. The Dui-Zuo 對作 (“Defending Creations”), and
the Wen-Kong 問孔 (“questioning Confucius”) chapters show us how Wang uses shi
to appraise teachings and sayings (言 yan).
The Dui-Zuo chapter shows us shi (實) connected with the oppositions shi (是)/fei
(非) and ran (然) (“what is the case”)/fou (否) (“what is not the case”). Shi (實) is
contrasted with xu (虛) (“falsity”, “merely apparent properties”, “empty [talk]”).23
The main purpose of the Dui-Zuo chapter is twofold: One purpose is to
demonstrate that corrections dui 對 are needed to the classic texts (everything which
has come before him) and to contemporary writings and teachings based on
“unfounded or empty assertions” (虛言 xu yan). Wang does something similar in the
beginning of the 問孔 Wen-Kong chapter. There he offers reasons for the “criticisms”
of Confucius he goes on to deliver, along with a method for appraising teachings or
One of the features of contemporary analytic philosophy of language is that it has generally made a
distinction between beliefs and teachings and what makes these things truth evaluable—most often
sentences or propositions (depending on one’s semantic theory). Beliefs and teachings then are truth
apt insofar as they express propositions or sentences, which can be truth apt. My belief itself cannot be
true, but the sentence or proposition I accept in the act of belief can be true or false, and it is in this
sense that the belief is said to be true or false, connected to the contents of belief. There are a couple of
reasons we generally think this needs to be done (a) teachings and beliefs, we think, are not linguistic
entities, and thus cannot themselves be semantically evaluated, (b) in desiring or requiring truth to be
unitary, insofar as we think there ought to be a single property of truth, we cannot make sense of two
different types of entity, propositions or sentences as linguistic entities, and beliefs as mental entities or
something like this, as having the same property (of truth), because we cannot explain how a single
property could belong to things of seemingly vastly different types. If one is a certain kind of pluralist
about truth, however (note that not all pluralists will find this acceptable), one can make sense of these
different types of entities being truth evaluable.
22
I do not argue here that Wang Chong held a pluralist view very much like the worked out views of
contemporary philosophers such as Lynch and Wright, but rather that his view of 實 shi is a kind of
pluralism that gets its start from the same intuitions and is spelled out in a similar way to contemporary
pluralist theories, in that multiple properties across domains or discourses can meet the concept of
truth, and thus things can be true in different ways or senses.
23
Wang’s xu is a much more complicated concept than even this jumble of translations suggests, and is
perhaps more different from our concept of “falsehood” than shi is from “truth”. I will discuss xu in
more detail below.
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statements in general (which he discusses and uses in the Dui-Zuo chapter as well).
Wang’s other purpose in this chapter is to defend his own work insofar as it is a
“creation” (作 zuo) rather than a “relation” or “tradition” (zhuan 專 or shu 術), and
the usefulness of “creations” in general.24 The dominant view of the day, as Wang
recounts in the chapter, is that only the sages were justified in creating (zuo) and that
those who are merely worthies should concentrate on transmitting (shu) the creations
of the sages.25 Wang here attempts to defend the usefulness of innovation by less than
sagely people such as himself. Wang is basically defending himself for his
“innovations” here, arguing that “creations” such as the Lun-Heng have become
necessary because corrections are needed to the traditions, which have perpetuated
falsehoods and exaggerations.
In the Dui-Zuo chapter, because it is both a defense of Wang’s work and an
explanation of the efficacy of “corrections” (dui 對), there is some consideration of
the concept of shi (實) and the related concepts of shi-fei (是非) and ran-fou (然否).
In the early part of the chapter, Wang discusses shi (實) and explains how certain
writings were historically necessary, due to the failure of the common people to
recognize the truth:
眾事不失實，凡論不懷亂，則桓譚之論不起。If the multitude in their works had not
gone astray from truth (shi), and some discussions had not gone bad and become
disordered, then Huan Tan would not have written his works (LH 84.362.15-16).26

It is for similar reasons that Wang Chong wrote the Lun-Heng. As he explains
near the end of the chapter:
論衡九“虛”，三“增”，所以使務實誠也。In the Lun-Heng the nine chapters on
“falsity” and three chapters on “exaggerations” are meant to create in people the
impetus to strive for truth (實 shi) and sincerity (誠 cheng) (LH 84.364.22).

24

There were a number of different views on the value of creation zuo in the Pre-Qin and Han periods.
Wang here is reacting against a particularly conservative strain of Confucianism in the Han which took
the claim of the Analects quite literally (in Analects 7.1 Confucius says “transmit, and don’t create” 述
而不作), that what scholars should be engaged in is transmitting (shu 述) rather than creating, and that
even the sages did not create new things. An alternative view held by some is that only the sages can
and are justified in creating (zuo), and that lesser persons, mere worthies such as Wang Chong cannot
and should not attempt to create. Michael Puett explores the different attitudes on zuo before Wang’s
time in Puett 2001.
25
A view advanced by a number of Pre-Qin and Han authors, according to Puett.
26
All passages from the Lun-Heng follow the chapter, page, and line numbering in the Lun-Heng-ZhuZi-Suo-Yin 《論衡逐字索引》 [Critical Essay: Concordance], Chinese University of Hong Kong
Institute of Chinese Studies, Ancient Text Concordance Series, No. 22 (Hong Kong: The Commercial
Press, 1996). Citation is chapter, page, line(s). All translations from the Lun-Heng are my own, unless
otherwise noted.
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We see here that the critical problem Wang is trying to address is the ignorance of
shi he thinks is endemic in his society and in the writings of contemporary scholars.
3.2. XU AS ATTRACTIVE AND “MERELY APPARENT” PROPERTIES
Shi is opposed with xu (虛), which is translated often as “emptiness” or “falsity”. The
sense of xu as “false” grows out of its meaning as “empty”, and in Wang’s writings it
is has the sense of “merely apparent qualities.” This way of understanding xu helps us
to make sense of passages in which Wang talks as if xu words or teachings qua xu
words and teachings are naturally attractive. Understanding xu as “falsity” does not
give us an explanation of the attractiveness of xu things, according to Wang.
Statements that are simply false do not necessarily attract us, unless they have some
other attractive features—such as making us feel better about ourselves, etc. It is not
the falsity of certain propositions that leads us to assent to, believe in, live by, or
otherwise adopt them, but rather some other attractive feature. With the concept xu,
however, there does seem to be a built in attractiveness xu entities possess qua xu
entities.
Wang mentions the seemingly attractive features of xu entities in the Dui-Zuo
chapter, in his discussion of shi (實). He says of the “common people”27:
俗之性，好奇怪之語，說虛妄之文。何則？實不能快意，而華虛驚耳動心也。是故
才能之士，好談論者，增益實事。 It is the nature of common people to enjoy strange
stories and sayings, to delight in empty (xu 虛) and absurd writings. Why is this? The
truth (shi 實) isn’t easily [or quickly] believed, but flowery and empty speech astounds
the hearers and excites their minds. This is why scholars with talent, who enjoy
discussion, add things to and exaggerate the truth (shi 實) about affairs (LH 84.362.26363.1).

Xu statements are (or at least can be) flowery, ornate, and naturally appealing to
the “common people” (with the intimation that those of high talent will not find xu
statements compelling). There seems to be a necessary link between xu and flowery
statements, as the “floweriness” of xu statements serves as the reason that the
common people tend to accept such statements. At first reading, it seems that Wang
has failed to consider two possibilities: that there might be (1) true statements that are
flowery; and (2) false or empty statements that are not flowery and appealing. But if
we take Wang to be claiming that there is something inherent in xu statements that
makes them appealing, we can show he is not making this (seemingly elementary)
mistake. Xu statements are appealing partly because they appear to be true, even
when “appearance” is thought of in terms of tendency to accept (something we easily
accept may be thought to, in this way, appear to us as true). Does this mean then that
Wang thinks of shi statements as appearing false, and thus being rejected by the
“common people?” If we take “appearing” true as linked to appeal to imagination, or
27

or, “simple people” (俗人 su ren).
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being “easily (or quickly) believed” (kuai yi 快意), then the fact that the truth is not
quickly or easily believed, or is unappealing to the “common” does show that it, in a
sense, does not appear true. Of course, it will appear true to those above the common,
who possess some wisdom, and it is thus the responsibility of such people to write
works promoting the truth, to stir up energy in the common people to seek the truth.
And it can come to appear true to the common people given proper instruction by
more wise people (such as Wang Chong and others he praises).
Does something appear to be true simply because someone asserts it, for
example? Think of a statement like “Confucius was 10 feet tall.” To assert this (in a
serious way, outside contexts of joking, fiction, or semantic ascent) is to assert it as
true, even though it is in fact false (one might be lying, ignorant, or misinformed). In
most normal contexts, a sentence such as this would be uttered so as to inform or
convince another person of certain features of Confucius, namely that he was 10 feet
tall. Assertion of x is to present x as true. It would be naïve, we might think, to take
assertion as grounds for belief, but if we consider the normal case, this is often what
we in fact do. We generally take a friend’s assertion that “it is 11:30 am” or “Bill isn’t
here yet” or “Bill has grey hair” as acceptable grounds for assenting to the statement
asserted. At more removed levels, we accept the assertions of experts of all kinds
when they say things like “smoking causes cancer,” or “Jupiter’s upper atmosphere is
90 percent hydrogen.” The mistake common people ( 俗 人 su ren) often make,
according to Wang, is failure to be reflective. They accept what is asserted by people
around them as true, even though these people are often either ignorant, misinformed,
or dishonest.
Xu statements, then, can be thought of as false statements that we are somehow
inclined to believe. So why are we inclined to believe them? Is it due to the mere fact
of their being asserted (in the right context)? Or is there some more robust
explanation? The above seems to suggest that there is something extra that xu
statements have.
Xu statements are not only ones we would be inclined to believe due to assertion,
but they have some other compelling quality—common people delight in them and
they appeal to the imagination. Thus, common people are more likely to imagine
these statements as possessing the properties that would make them shi, based on
wishful thinking. We can see how this might work. Human psychology is such that it
is far easier to get someone to believe something they would like to be true than
something they either have no interest in or do not want to be true. This facet of our
psychology can be and has been used to great effect by those wishing to deceive in
various ways. 28 But how about in cases of ignorance or misinformation? The
28

What I mention here is similar to some forms of cognitive bias, such as wishful thinking and
confirmation bias. There are many other forms of cognitive bias as well, which shows how prone
humans are in general to accept false statements as true even in the face of overwhelming evidence of
their falsity. This is very much Wang’s worry. In fact many of the problems with the beliefs of su ren
he mentions in the Lun-Heng line up with a number of cognitive biases contemporary behavioral
psychologists discuss. He most vehemently heaps scorn upon wishful thinking, which he isolates as a
particularly pressing problem among common people in his time.
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statement “Bill is 6 feet tall” may be false, and I may believe and thus assert this
statement, to inform a friend about features of Bill. I may have been misinformed,
however, having never met Bill. In fact, say, Bill is only 5 feet 7 inches tall. There is
nothing intrinsically compelling, beyond my assertion, about the statement “Bill is 6
feet tall.” This is not something we would expect to “appeal to the imagination” or be
believed due to a human inclination to accept the fantastic. Rather, it will generally be
accepted because I assert it and the listener has no reason to doubt that what I say in
such cases is true. So is this statement xu?
For Wang, statements of this kind are not xu. There are statements, like my
example of “Bill is 6 feet tall,” that are not-shi but are also not-xu. The reason Wang
does not speak about this kind of statement is that he is mainly concerned with xu
statements as compelling to su ren. Xu statements are most problematic. We can and
do easily correct our mistakes when they involve things that we have no general
inclination to accept. My friend might believe me that Bill is 6 feet tall, but when he
gets different information from someone else, he will likely come to doubt what I told
him, and remain agnostic about Bill’s height until meeting him. However, xu
statements are much trickier than this because cognitive bias is involved. We are
hesitant to give up belief in statements we would like to be true, for example, and
often hold to them even in the face of overwhelming evidence that they are false.
Shi 實 , as the opposite of xu, is being used to flag actual properties (the actual
possession of the properties we seek when appraising statements) as opposed to
merely apparent properties (the mere apparent possession of these properties) of
statements, teachings, or whatever can be shi-apt. To see what these properties are,
we have to look to Wang’s discussion surrounding concepts related to shi and xu.
3.3. MORAL NORMATIVITY
In the Dui-Zuo chapter there are two dichotomies discussed in relation with shi and
xu—namely shi-fei (是非) and ran-fou (然否). In the Dui-Zuo chapter, shi (是) and
fei (非) when discussed as concepts rather than verbally used, seem to be connected
to ethical or normative contexts. Alfred Forke, in his translation, noticed this and
translated shi (是) and fei (非 ) in the Dui-Zuo chapter as “right” and “wrong”
respectively, in all the places where they are discussed as evaluative properties. We
see shi and fei mentioned along with ran and fou, “is the case” and “is not the case” in
discussions of shi (實) in the chapter. Two passages in particular show us the two
dichotomies discussed together:
明辯然否，病心傷之，安能不論？ … ［孟子］引平直說，褒是抑非 。
Those who can determine what is the case and what is not the case feel an ailment
in their hearts which pain them [at the thought of truth being subverted by the
“common people” and flowery scholarship] … [Mencius’] language was straight
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and to the point, according high place to the right (是 shi) and suppressing the
wrong (非 fei) (LH 84.363.3-5).29
One may find it curious that shi and fei are translated here as “right” and “wrong”,
which suggest moral normativity, while ran and fou are translated in more clearly
truth-evaluative terms as “what is the case” and “what is not the case”. What is the
justification for the difference? Are we given any reason to read shi and fei as I do in
the above passage? A consideration of some other instances of shi and fei in this
chapter may help. The following passage is crucial for understanding the normative
use, as well as for understanding how Wang may be seen as a pluralist about truth.
況論衡細說微論，解釋世俗之疑，辯照是非之理，使後進曉見然否之分。The LunHeng uses precise language and detailed discussion, to reveal and explain the doubts of
this generation of common people, to bring to light through debate right and wrong
principles (是非之理 shi fei zhi li), and to help those who come later clearly see the
difference between what is the case and what is not the case (LH 84.364.10-11).30

Here, we see shi and fei connected to the “principles” (li 理) Wang aims to
uncover. His purpose in the Lun-Heng is to reveal shi and fei principles and to help
people distinguish between what is the case and what is not the case. What is the
reason for using of two different formulations here, shi-fei and ran-fou, if he means
something like “truth and falsity” in both cases? It is implausible that this should be
seen as simply using synonyms to mean something like “truth and falsity”, so that he
is saying that he wants to (1) uncover true and false principles, and (2) help people
distinguish between what is true and false. This point is strengthened by his use of li
(理), by which Wang means something like “moral principle.” This is far from the
Song Neo-Confucian use of li (理) to express a foundational metaphysical concept.
The above mentioned is the only occurrence of li in the Dui-Zuo chapter, but if we
look to the Wen-Kong (“Questioning Confucius”) chapter, in which consideration of
argument and method is a central theme31, we learn more about how Wang uses li.
難 孔 子， 何 傷於 義？ 誠有 傳 聖業 之 知， 伐孔 子之 說 ，何 逆 於理 ？ … [if we]
challenge Confucius, how is this injurious to moral appropriateness? If, sincerely

29

It is useful here to consider Forke’s translation as well, which, like my own, uses “right” and
“wrong” for 是 shi and 非 fei: “He who knows how to discriminate between truth (ran) and falsehood
(fou), must feel a pang at it; why should he not speak? … [Mencius] used plain and straightforward
language to recommend what was right, and to reject what was wrong.”
30
Forke reads the shi in the final part of this passage as causally connected to bringing light to right
and wrong principle—he translates: “… intended to explain the right and wrong principles so that
future generations can clearly see the difference between truth and falsehood.” (Forke 1907, p. 88)
31
This is somewhat contentious. Michael Nylan argues (Nylan 1996) that Wang’s purpose in the WenKong chapter was to show Confucius an ultimately unsuccessful teacher, while I argue (McLeod 2007)
that Wang’s purpose in Wen-Kong was primarily methodological rather than critical.
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attempting to transmit the knowledge of the sages’ teachings, one attacks Confucius’
words, how does this oppose principle (li)? (LH 28.122.7)

This is clearly a view of li as either the collection of moral norms or the ground of
moral norms. Wang’s second sentence is explaining his first. Challenging (難 nan)
Confucius is not injurious to moral appropriateness ( 義 yi), because attacking
Confucius’ words in order to clear things up does not violate the correct moral
principles that make certain acts appropriate or inappropriate. This is also argued in
another passage in the Wen-Kong chapter, 32 in which Wang criticizes Confucius for
violating li by picking on the weaknesses of Meng Yizi and thus acting “contrary to
the will of the Duke of Zhou” (違周公之志).
If we take these uses of li to be the same as that in the above passage from the
Dui-Zuo chapter, then it looks like the passage gives us two separate goals of the LunHeng—a moral goal, uncovering true moral principles, and a non-moral goal, of
determining what is the case and what is not the case. Now, the question becomes,
why distinguish the two? Wouldn’t simply “discovering the truth” take care of both
of these? Why didn’t Wang simply say that the purpose of the Lun-Heng is to
uncover the truth, to help us distinguish between shi 實 and xu 虛, which seems his
main purpose as he describes it in other passages? If he is after truth, after all, then it
looks like facts about moral principles and what is the case will just fall out of this
pursuit. If we know what is true, then by definition we will know which moral
principles, if any, are right, because we will know whether normative statements,
such as “one should never pick on the weaknesses of another,” are true.
There seems to be some connection between fou-ran and shi-fei in LH 84.363.3-5
above, where Wang talks about Mencius’ ability and action. According to this
passage, those who have the ability to discriminate between what is the case and what
is not the case (ran and fou) are able to use language to point out what is right (是 shi)
and what is wrong (非 fei). So knowledge of moral principle does seem to follow
from ability to discriminate between what is and what is not the case. Does this,
however, show us that there is a single property of truth, such as ran (what is the case)
operative in all contexts? A consideration of shi (實) shows us that it is the wise
person’s grasp of shi (實) that enables him to both distinguish between what is and
what is not the case and to distinguish between right and wrong moral principles. It is
not, that is, ability to distinguish between ran and fou which makes one able to
distinguish between shi and fei, but rather the ability to distinguish between shi (實)
and xu (虛) which makes one able to make both of the other types of discrimination.
The fact that Mencius had the ability to distinguish between ran and fou showed that
he had the ability on which the ability to distinguish between shi (是) and fei (非)
rests.
The ability to distinguish between 實 shi and 虛 xu then presumes the ability to
make a number of other useful discriminations involving teachings, statements, and
32

LH 28.123.1
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other entities. Shi and xu, that is, seem like higher-order concepts, unlike ran and fou
or shi and fei. I believe the best way to make sense of this is to take 是 shi and 然 ran
as ways in which something can be 實 shi (“actual”, “true”), while 非 fei and 否 fou
are ways in which something can be 虛 xu (“empty”, “false”, “only apparently true”).
That is, Wang is offering a view of 實 shi in which what makes a statement (言 yan)
實 shi is either being 是 shi, or being 然 ran.
A moral principle, such as mentioned in the above case: “don’t attack people’s
weaknesses” can be 是 shi or 非 fei, but we can clearly see (we would share Wang’s
intuition) that phrased in this way, it cannot be “the case” or “not the case”, because it
is not an assertion about a state of affairs. We could reformulate this so it would look
like an assertion about a state of affairs, and render it this way: “one should not attack
people’s weaknesses.” This formulation seems “is the case”-apt, as it is formulated in
such a way as to suggest the possibility of a state-of-affairs that makes it the case that
one should (or should not) attack people’s weaknesses, whether we understand this
state-of-affairs to involve moral facts (whatever these are), teleological features of
humans, or anything else that could belong to a state-of-affairs of the world and also
explain the normativity involved in this principle.
Wang, however, does not evaluate moral principles in this way, in terms of statesof-affairs. He considers statements like “don’t attack people’s weaknesses” and their
acceptability in terms of 是 shi and 非 fei, “right” and “wrong”. If normativity in
moral cases is basic on Wang’s view, and not based on facts about “what is the case”,
we can explain easily why Wang distinguished 實 shi-making properties for moral
statements from 實 shi-making properties for non-moral statements. There are simply
different properties which make these different kinds of statements or teachings 實 shi
(true, actual). And if this is the case, then Wang can be seen as a pluralist about 實 shi,
in a way similar to contemporary alethic pluralist theorists about “truth”.33

33

Special thanks are due to a reviewer of this article who correctly points out that the evidence I have
offered here is not by itself conclusive to show that Wang held a pluralist theory of truth, especially
one using the terminology and concepts of contemporary analytic philosophy. Although Wang perhaps
did not explicitly have a pluralist view like the one I sketch below, I think this theory is the best way to
make sense of what Wang says in the Lun-Heng concerning shi, as it makes his position strongest,
even though what he says is also compatible with a number of other interpretations, including the
possibility that the differences between evaluative terms in different contexts were merely stylistic.
Although I import the conceptual apparatus of contemporary analytic philosophy to reconstruct
Wang’s view of truth, I realize that this distorts Wang’s view to the extent that Wang did not work
with such a conceptual apparatus. Much of what follows below is my attempt to reconstruct Wang’s
basic view of truth and extend it using the tools available to contemporary philosophy. Thus, much of
what follows is not explicitly held by Wang, but rather is a natural way of developing his pluralist view
of truth. As such, it can be seen as continuous with Wang’s theory of truth, even if it is less useful for
understanding the way early Chinese thinkers theorized about truth (although the general pluralism I
attribute to Wang above can, I think, be useful for this latter project as well).
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3.4. UNIVOCALITY AND THE USEFULNESS OF WANG’S THEORY OF
TRUTH
Which properties then are expressed by 實 shi? Moral acceptability (是 shi) is one
property expressed by 實 shi, in the moral domain. This property of acceptability
would not, however, make non-moral statements about physical objects true. This
property can only be a shi-making property in the appropriate domain. Non-moral
statements cannot be 是 shi, just as moral principles cannot be 然 ran.34
At least one difficult problem remains, however. One key feature of the concept
of truth, or the concept of 實 shi, is that it should be a univocal concept. Even though
there might be different properties in different linguistic contexts that make a
statement true, it can not be the case that “truth” (or 實 shi) means different things in
different contexts. It should mean the same thing to say that a moral statement is true
as it does to say that a non-moral statement is true. As I’ve shown in the previous
section, one way of capturing this is to define the concept of truth by way of a number
of platitudes that any property in any relevant domain must meet in order to be a truth
property. Thus, the meaning of ‘truth’ can be understood in terms of the platitudes,
while the properties the concept expresses are variable in different contexts. Wang
Chong, however, does not seem aware of either this problem of univocality or the
conception of fixing the meaning of truth via platitudes. Shouldn’t this lead us to
question whether Wang actually did have a pluralist view of truth?
I think that the question of how to account for the univocality of shi did not arise
for Wang due to his conception of what the property of 實 shi is, and how it relates to
the “truthmaking” properties 是 shi and 然 ran. On Wang’s view of 實 shi, there is no
difficulty in accounting for univocality, because the concept of shi is of a unified
second-order property linked to particular truthmaking properties that differ by
context.
We find passages in the Lun-Heng that show us that Wang did think of shi as
univocal. The following passage from the Dui-Zuo chapter is informative here:
人君遭弊，改教於上； 君臣（愚）惑，作論於下。［下］實得，則上教從矣。冀
悟迷惑之心，使知虛實之分。實虛之分定，而華僞之文滅；華僞之文滅，則純誠之
化日以孳矣。 When the ruler does badly, instruction to change conduct is directed
toward the person on high. When the ruler’s subjects are doltish, engaging in discussions
is directed toward the people below. When the people below obtain the truth (實 shi),
then instruction of the person on high follows. I hope to stir some of these minds, to help
them distinguish between truth (實 shi) and falsity (虛 xu). Once the distinction between
truth and falsity is established, then flowery and artificial writings can be eliminated.
When flowery and artificial writings are eliminated, pure and sincere transformations
will grow more abundant day by day (LH 84.363.12-14).
34

This seems to mesh with our own intuitions if we consider sentences like “don’t attack people’s
weaknesses.” It seems to make no sense to say that this can be the case or not be the case, whether or
not a reformulation as described above will give us a sentence that can be the case or not be the case.
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In this passage, we see that the ability to distinguish between shi and xu leads to
transformation of conduct as well as the elimination of error in writings. Since much
of Wang’s criticism in the Lun-Heng is directed at physical and metaphysical as well
as moral writings, we can see this second ability as reaching both moral and nonmoral domains or contexts. Wang also asserts a connection between elimination of
false (虛 xu) writings and moral transformation (we have to assume this is what he
means here by 化 hua, as the passage began by speaking of conduct and this should
be taken to point back to that). We see again that the ability to discriminate between
實 shi and 虛 xu allows us to both distinguish between 然 ran and 否 fou and to
distinguish between 是 shi and 非 fei. In order for this to be the case, there must be
some univocal concept of 實 shi that captures the similarities between the various
properties which count as shi-properties.
Although it is difficult to completely demonstrate the case based on what Wang
says in the Lun-Heng, I suggest that the view I outline below on the univocality of shi
is most like the one Wang held. It explains why he didn’t see a problem with
maintaining its univocality while maintaining pluralism. In addition, the view I
attribute to Wang here can, I think, offer us an alternative way to solve some of the
problems raised for pluralist theories.
The univocality of shi is based on its second-order status. Shi, for Wang, is the
property of having properties that we actually do and should seek when we appraise
statements. There are a number of parts of his analysis of shi. First, it is a secondorder property, but a second order pluralistic property. It is not “the property of
having some (one) property such that [the truth-making description is met],” (as both
Lynch and Wright specify the second-order view35), but rather it is “the property of
having properties such that [the truth-making description is met].” This move actually
has a great deal of philosophical payoff, in that it removes the force of objections to
pluralism based on the problem of mixed conjunctions, as I explain below.
Shi, for Wang, can be thought of as expressing a second-order property—the
property of having a property or properties that we should and do seek when
appraising statements. This makes truth rest on normativity. The normativity involved
here, however, is basic, in a sense that what we should do is linked with what we do
in fact do, but is not explained by the fact that we do these things. That is, the
descriptive element is not meant to explain the normative, but be a further basic fact
beside it. Here, both concepts are in the employ of the truth function, as an
explanation for what makes a particular statement shi. If we consider the properties of
然 ran and 是 shi that can belong to statements in the non-moral and moral domains,
respectively, we can begin to see what is meant. The properties of ran and shi are
properties humans naturally seek when they appraise sentences, according to Wang.
No one accepts as true a statement they believe to be 不然 bu ran or 非 fei. Rather,
35

Although Lynch rejects a second-order property view of truth, in part due to the difficulties
discussed below.
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the reason a statement is accepted by anyone is because one believes (sometimes
mistakenly) that this statement is either 然 ran, 是 shi, or has some other 實 shimaking property. It is a brute fact about humans that we do seek properties such as 是
shi and 然 ran when we appraise sentences and accept or believe statements based on
whether or not we have reason to think they are ran or shi. Thus the key question to
be answered when we consider whether or not something is 實 shi is whether the
statement actually has the properties we naturally seek. In addition to this description
of what humans actually do, however, there is an added normative element. Not only
do we seek properties like 然 ran and 是 shi, but we ought to seek such properties.
Why ought we? That is, what explains the normativity? I believe (though it would
take much more space than I have here to argue) that Wang takes this normativity as
explanatorily basic. Although this certainly would strike most of us in the
contemporary western-based philosophical tradition as strange or implausible, this
view (if Wang’s own) would not, by any means, have been unprecedented in ancient
China. The Mohists give us the best example of a group of thinkers who may have
had a similar view of certain normative statements as basic.
Wang’s view of the univocality of shi has a couple of interesting features, relevant
to the contemporary debate surrounding pluralism and truth in general. It is
sometimes objected that pluralism cannot account for the truth of statements or
propositions that are conjunctions of propositions belonging to different linguistic
domains. The reason for this, in general, is that on most pluralist theories, there are
particular properties in particular domains that play the truth role. For example, say
that in non-moral contexts, correspondence plays the truth role, while in moral and
aesthetic contexts something like coherence plays the truth role. There then becomes
a problem in giving an account of what plays the truth role for propositions
containing both non-moral and moral or aesthetic conjuncts.
Wang’s theory of shi has an easy solution to this problem. In fact, we might think
that one of the reasons that the problem never occurred to Wang is that it could never
have gained traction given his particular view of shi. Because a statement is shi just in
case it has the properties we do and should seek when appraising sentences, it is not
necessary for there to be only one particular property playing the truth role for a given
statement. The necessity of there being one truth-making property for any given
statement or proposition, I contend, is what gets the pluralist into the problem.
However, if ‘is true’ expresses a unique truth property that is linked (in virtue of
being a second order property) to the lower level “truth properties”, there is no need
to rely on only one property to play the truth-making role. Lynch’s theory does
require a single property to play the truth role for any given proposition, because of
his functionalist theory, and Wright appears to need it as well, because he specifies
the higher order property as being linked to the (single) property that meets the
platitudes in a given domain. The truth property can be defined differently, however,
so as not to link it to a single truth-making property that must belong to a statement
for it to be true. If a statement is true when it has properties we do and should seek, it
is not necessary for a mixed conjunction to have a single lower-level property that
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makes it true. It is enough that both conjuncts are true by virtue of having properties
we do and should seek.
Consider the following mixed conjunction:
“Mars is the 4th closest planet to the sun and murder is wrong.”
Wang can account for the truth (實 shi) of this statement by analysis of the
properties of the logical parts, here the conjuncts. If each of the conjuncts has lowerlevel properties we do and should seek and on the basis of which we do and should
accept statements, then the conjunction is 實 shi. And there is no difficulty here,
because the two conjuncts are true in exactly the same way—that is, they both
possess properties we do and should seek, and thus the entire statement possesses
these properties. Note that the entire statement does not possess both ran and shi (the
moral conjunct does not possess the property of ran, for example), but the entire
statement does possess the second-order property of 實 shi in virtue of the possession
of each conjunct of properties we do and should seek. We can explain this ultimately
in terms of the properties at the lowest level, in this case 然 ran and 是 shi, but we
can construct ever higher levels in the theory of 實 shi. Thus, the above statement is
實 shi in virtue of having shi-making properties (然 ran and 是 shi), and the conjuncts
considered separately are 實 shi in virtue of having 然 ran (in the first conjunct) and
是 shi (in the second). We can see here that refraining from tying the truth property to
a single truth-making lower level property has enormous advantages over the
properties defined by Wright and Lynch.
So what of another objection made to the view of the truth property as a secondorder property, which Lynch raises against Wright’s second order view of truth? If
the second-order property obtains in virtue of a proposition’s meeting the various
platitudes for truth, then it looks like the truth property itself doesn’t meet the
platitudes for truth. Thus, the second-order property does not itself qualify as a truth
property under the definition of truth properties on Wright’s account. 36 Wang
Chong’s account of shi does not have this problem. Although it is a second-order
property, unlike Wright’s truth property it does itself qualify as a truth property under
the conceptual description of truth (shi).
The property expressed by shi is the property of (actually) having properties that
we do and should seek when appraising statements. Does this property itself meet the
36

Lynch 2009, p. 64-65: “Wright is barred from identifying even this wafer‐thin property—the
property of having a property that satisfies the platitudes or falls under the concept of truth—with the,
or even “a” property of truth. For the property of having a property that falls under the descriptive
concept of truth, doesn't itself fall under that description. Again, that description consists, essentially,
in a list of the platitudes that a property must satisfy. But is the property of having a property that, e.g.,
is distinct from warrant, possessed by asserted propositions, is objective, and so on a property with all
those features? No. It is the property of having a property with those features. Hence a view like
Wright's which identifies truth with whatever property satisfies the platitudes in a particular domain
must hold that the second‐order property of having a property that plays that role is distinct from truth:
call it truth*. And this in turn makes it hard to see how reductive pluralism solves the problem of
mixed inferences and associated problems. For while she can say that there is a property preserved by
valid mixed inferences, that property is truth*, not truth.”
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criteria for being shi? That is, is this property something that we do and should seek
when appraising statements? It is. But notice that we will only be concerned about
whether or not shi obtains when there is semantic ascent, or some question as to
whether a certain statement does actually or does not have the lower-level properties
we seek when appraising statements. Consider the statement:
“One should imitate the actions of the Zhou kings.”
This statement may be 實 shi by virtue of having the property of 是 shi (right). So
there are two relevant properties here—實 shi (true) and 是 shi (right). 實 Shi is the
second order property. So, are we looking for that when we appraise this sentence? In
a sense we are—we are looking for both. The second order property is especially
relevant when we engage in semantic ascent. Consider the statement:
“The statement ‘you should imitate the actions of the Zhou kings’ is true (實
shi).”
What property or properties do we and should we seek when appraising this
sentence? Now that we have semantically ascended, the lowest level properties such
as 然 ran and 是 shi will be out of the immediate picture, and the sentence must be
appraised to see if it has the property of 實 shi. What we ought to and will seek here
is the second order property itself, because the possession of this will tell us whether
the relevant statement is true. Thus, the relevant properties of this statement are the
original property of 是 shi (right), which makes the second order property of 實 shi
obtain, and a third-order 實 shi property along side of that.
So the question of whether the second (and higher) order property of shi can be
something itself that counts as a truth property under the given definition of truth can
be answered in the affirmative. 37 The definition of truth given here does not bar

37

There may be some worry here that the property of 實 shi belonging to mixed conjunctions (preascent) will be third-order properties rather than second-order properties. If we take the shi-ness of the
full conjunction as a function of the shi-ness of the conjuncts, this will necessarily be the case.
However, I do not believe this is the right way to see shi in cases of conjunctions, or any statement.
What I propose here goes beyond anything Wang says, of course, and is meant as simply a way of
making sense of how shi is a second-order property even in cases of mixed conjunctions. Since shi is
an appraisal term—it is a property that belongs to a statement if and only if that statement has the
properties we do and should seek in appraising statements—it need only apply to appraised statements.
That is, shi might be understood as a tag telling us whether a statement has the desired properties or
not. It need not be the case, if we are appraising a conjunction, that the conjunction is shi based on
each of the conjuncts being shi, even if those conjuncts would be shi if appraised individually. The
reason shi can work like this is that it is based on human goals—what we do and ought to seek. Thus,
independently of our appraisal of a particular statement, there do not have to be shi-facts about it.
Thus, a mixed conjunction can have the second-order property of shi based on having the property of
ran and shi in its conjuncts, without being based on having the individual property shi of each
conjunct. However, if we appraise the conjuncts separately as individual statements, we can also take
them as having the property of shi, based on the lower-level properties each possess. As I say above,
this explanation goes well beyond anything we can find in Wang Chong, but I believe this addition
keeps with Wang’s general view of shi, and gives us a way to better understand how a shi property like
Wang’s can work.
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higher-order properties constructed in this way from serving as truth-making
properties.
So we have seen that Wang can offer us a way of understanding how the predicate
‘is true’ can express a unique, second-order property, while avoiding some problems
for such views. Of course, accepting something like Wang’s view depends on how far
we’re willing to go with him on the explanatory basic quality of descriptive and
normative facts about human behavior. We might part ways with Wang at a number
of different points—whether it has to do with our objection to holding truth to be that
closely linked with human behavior (is this a radical anti-realism?), whether it has to
do with our resistance to accepting as basic the kinds of facts Wang does, or whether
it has to do with issues of possible vicious circularity in the definition of 實 shi. All of
these issues, of course, remain to be worked out. But if they can be satisfactorily
worked out, we have a ready made way to answer objections to pluralist theories of
truth as well as a way to offer better explanations for certain key features of truth that
any theory, pluralist or monist, must account for.
In addition to helping in the contemporary debate surrounding truth and pluralism,
Wang’s pluralist view of shi, focusing as it does on the distinction between moral and
non-moral statements, also might help us to understand the concept of truth in early
Chinese philosophy in general. Although the particular formulation of a pluralist
theory of truth using shi as the truth concept is new to Wang, implicitly pluralist
theories of truth in China in general do not begin with Wang Chong. Pluralist
intuitions about truth can be found as early as the Mo-Zi. The best way to understand
the seeming switch between pragmatic-sounding arguments and correspondence
based reasoning in the Mo-Zi can be explained by attributing a pluralist conception of
truth to the author(s) of the text. This conception is not fleshed out in early texts such
as the Mo-Zi, however. I also suspect that this incipient pluralism about truth is at the
heart of the “paradoxes” of the Gong-Sun-Long-Zi. Gong Sun Long is, I believe,
noticing an intuitive difficulty with pluralist theories of truth that arises when we have
defined no univocal concept of truth that captures the different truth-making
properties. With Wang’s more worked out (although not fully worked out) conception
of shi as truth, we can look backward to come to a better understanding of the
incipient pluralism in earlier thinkers. In this sense, understanding Wang’s theory of
shi can help us to understand truth in early China in general. Of course, the tie
between Wang’s theory and those of his predecessors will have to be developed in
future work.
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